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Adolf Berle During the New Deal:  The Brain Truster as an Intellectual 
Jobber 
Robert B. Thompson 
Abstract 
Thirty-seven year old law professor Adolf Berle had a career year in 1932. His book published 
that year, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (written with Gardiner Means), framed 
the fundamental twentieth century change in understanding modern corporations.  Berle’s 
exchange with Merrick Dodd on the purpose of the corporation that played out that spring on 
the pages of the Harvard Law Review launched a still fierce debate over the role of shareholders 
and other stakeholders. His service as a brain truster for Franklin Roosevelt during the fall 
election gave voice to the transformative economic policies of the New Deal.  This article looks 
at what came next, particularly Berle’s career development and policy impact during the twelve 
years of the Roosevelt administration.  Somewhat surprisingly, he didn’t join the government for 
its first five years, and when he eventually moved to Washington it was for a job in the State 
Department.  This exploration of his role between 1933 and 1945 reveals a driving force of these 
career choices—his strong affinity (evidenced not just in this period but in the time before and 
after) to work as a brain truster. What that meant to Berle was to be an intellectual jobber and 
free-lancer, taking on a series of important tasks, often suggesting big ideas, before moving on 
to the next challenge.  Part II takes a deep dive into the planning for post-war international 
economic policy that commenced immediately after World War II broke out in Europe in 1939, 
not long after Berle had joined the State Department, and in which he was assigned a key role. 
This examination provides a fuller picture of the process leading to new international 
institutions in trade, monetary policy, and assembling global capital while at the same time 
illustrating the familiar characteristics of Berle as an intellectual jobber. 
 
 Adolf Berle’s ideas have attained a remarkable longevity in corporate law with an 
influence exceeding that of any other twentieth century law professor.1  Participants in the now 
ten Berle symposia often have framed the discussion of his career as an intellectual history, 
usually built around the powerful transformative effect of The Modern Corporation and Private 
                                                     
 Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University. I am grateful to Bill Bratton, Daniel 
Ernst and Brad Snyder for sharing comments and sources about the New Deal and Berle and to Elizabeth Pollman 
for linking Berle the corporate academic to his writing on broader policy issues.  Jeremy Goldstein and Sherry Yu 
provided helpful research on this project. 
1 Some have gone further, such as the editors of the Letters of Louis Brandeis who described Berle as “one of the 
most influential public policy intellectuals of the Twentieth Century.”  See LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, vol. 4 at 36-
37 (edited by Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy) (State University of New York Press 1975). 
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Property (“MCPP”). 2  Yet this approach is insufficient to explain large parts of Berle’s 
professional career including what Berle did during the twelve years of the Roosevelt 
administration that immediately followed MCPP.  This article offers an alternative focus that 
better accounts for the career of an intellectual jobber, as Berle described himself.  Intellectual 
history is still relevant—how it could it not be when ideas were Berle’s stock in trade—but 
political history is at the forefront of this account, with particular attention to the interaction of 
Berle’s personal traits in this historical context, particularly his inclination to focus on one-off 
settings into which he could parachute and quickly exit. 
 This opening section provides introductory observations as to: Berle’s biography before, 
during and after the New Deal; the evolution of his writing during those periods; and the 
personal traits that shaped his entire professional life. Parts I and II focus on Berle during the 
Roosevelt administration, the first five years based in New York City (but still an important 
participant in the president’s circle) and the last seven at the State Department (and 
immediately adjacent to the White House). Part III is a briefer treatment of his time after the 
New Deal.  Each part develops an observation visible in each setting—Berle as a brain truster, 
intellectual jobber, and public intellectual.  He was able to command most any topic on short 
notice and articulate a vision of a changed role for government in the economy, but less able to 
effectively implement policies reflecting those ideas.  PartIIB takes a deep dive into the 
preparations of the American government during the time that Berle was at the State 
Department for a post-war international economic order, particularly planning for new 
international institutions in trade, monetary policy, and assembling global capital. This 
examination is valuable, independently of any discussion of Berle, for framing Brexit, Trump 
and key current disagreements on the global economic stage but it is also helps understand 
Berle and his role during the New Deal. 
Berle was raised mostly in the Boston area, recognized as a child prodigy before 
entering Harvard College at 14, followed by Harvard Law, and a job at the Brandeis firm.  World 
War I intervened, providing experiences that stimulated his life-long interests in Latin America 
and diplomacy, but even more significantly led him to turn away from his Boston and Harvard 
roots and make his way in New York City.  There his public commentary on foreign affairs, 
involvement in native American issues in the west, and living in the Henry Street settlement 
gave way to a determined focus to reframe corporate law for a new era.3  In 1932 his book with 
Gardiner Means, MCPP, set out the separation of ownership and control in the American 
corporation that shaped federal regulatory policy in corporate law for the remainder of the 
                                                     
2 Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (hereafter MCPP). 
3 Jordan Schwarz’s biography of Berle very effectively covers this and other parts of Berle’s life.  Jordan Schwarz, 
LIBERAL, ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA (MacMillan, 1987). For Berle’s focus on foreign affairs in his 
writing between 1919 and 1923, see the 13 articles listed in that period in the bibliography, The Published Works of 
Adolf A. Berle 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1964) (hereafter “Published Works”).  Between 1923 and 1931, Berle 
published fourteen law review articles on corporate law, mostly in the Harvard and Columbia Law Reviews.  Id. 
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century.4  A contemporaneous exchange on the pages of the Harvard Law Review with Merrick 
Dodd framed a debate on the purpose of the corporation—for the benefit of shareholders or 
other stakeholders—that still anchors contemporary discussions of that topic.5  During that 
same year, as a member of the brain trust for Franklin Roosevelt (and the speechwriter for the 
candidate’s important Commonwealth Club Speech during the fall campaign), Berle’s voice 
helped elect a president and bring in the New Deal with its massive changes in American 
government.6  For the thirty-seven year old law professor, those three accomplishment in one 
year amounted to an intellectual trifecta. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Berle did not go into the new administration after the election, 
as did other brain trusters.  Rather, he went back to New York City to his law practice and 
teaching at Columbia and being a brain truster for Fiorello LaGuardia in the 1933 and 1937 
mayoral campaigns.  In between he served as chamberlain for the city (the last chamberlain 
before the job was abolished), all the while maintaining access to the President, taking on 
specific tasks for him, and regularly helping develop and explain economic policy.7  Berle joined 
the Roosevelt administration full time in 1938 as Assistant Secretary of State, staying for the 
next seven years and then an additional year as U.S. Ambassador to Brazil.  His portfolio still 
reflected his access to the President and presidential assignments, including some delicate 
matters related to intelligence and alleged communist infiltration.  He was positioned to have a 
key role in planning the post-war international economic structure, which was ongoing from 
the time war broke out in Europe in mid-1939.  This process led to the creation of the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization that provide 
the basis for contemporary international interaction in monetary affairs, development, and 
trade.  One of the earliest meetings with John Maynard Keynes on the British side took place in 
                                                     
4 See MCPP, supra note 2. 
5 See, Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) and Adolf A. Berle, 
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932), which were published 
respectively in the May and June 1932 issues of the Harvard Law Review, after the Berle and Means book had been 
finished but before its publication and just as Berle began working on FDR’s campaign.  Dodd’s piece had been a 
response to an earlier article by Berle published the prior year. See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Law as Powers in 
Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).William Bratton and Michael Wachter have shown that the actual 1932 
exchange between Berle and Dodd does not have as much purchase for the contemporary 
shareholder/stakeholder primacy discussions as modern writers may see.  The two professors were on different 
wings of a then-current corporatist approach to corporate theory and each writer later changed his position in 
ways that blur where they would stand in the modern debate that invokes their names.  See William W. Bratton 
and Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 99 (2008).  For a discussion of the Berle-Dodd personal relationship in which this exchange was embedded, 
see Charles O’Kelley, this symposium.   
6 See William Bratton, this symposium, for a discussion of the Commonwealth Club speech and Berle’s role in the 
campaign. 
7 See Part I below. 
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Berle’s office and he was a key link in discussions with the British about post-war economic 
matters.8 
After the war, with a new president and a new set of presidential advisers, Berle 
returned to New York City to teach at Columbia, working with foundations, and generally 
pursuing the role of a public intellectual.9  Having essentially stopped publishing in law 
reviews10 and producing little in the way of books11 during the twelve years of the Roosevelt 
administration, Berle again picked up his writing.  Much of Berle’s law review writing of the 
post-war period returned to specific aspects of corporate law.12  The books picked up on the 
themes of MCPP but the corporatist threads of the earlier work has given way to what Bill 
Bratton has called a happier story where “big stick” government had emerged to keep 
corporations in line.13  By the time of Berle’s death in 1971, this political economy approach had 
been challenged by competing ideologies including what would become the market-based 
deregulatory corporate law theories that flowered during the 1980s.14 
The political history of the period enhances the understanding of the evolution of 
Berle’s career.  In the 1920s he was still gathering ideas and data about structural changes in 
the corporate space in a post-industrial revolution economy.  His focus was on building-out a 
new understanding of corporate finance in an economic environment where the Berle and 
                                                     
8 See Part II below. 
9 See Part III below. 
10 See, Published Works  supra note 3. There were two law review articles in the 1933-1945 period, one a five-page 
printing of his commencement remarks at Cornell Law School in 1938 and the other a fourteen page, post-1934 
follow-up of his 1931 article on liability for stock market manipulation. See Adolf A. Berle, Stock Market 
Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 393 (1938). 
11 See Published Works, supra note 3.  Between 1933 and 1945 he published a new edition of his casebook on 
corporate finance (with a co-author), a short French tract on man and property, a twenty-one-page book on 
NATIONAL REALISM AND CHRISTIAN FAITH, and a book on liquidity co-authored with a student that addressed new forms 
of liquidity for property including particularly ownership of shares in modern corporations.  Two books from this 
period related to his government service are addressed later in this article, one a book based on his testimony to 
TNEC in 1939 regarding government providing of capital and the other his 1940 book, NEW DIRECTIONS AND THE NEW 
WORLD, based on a series of articles he had written about the state of world affairs. See notes 63, and 72 infra and 
accompanying text. 
12 For example, a 1952 article on corporate personhood reflects some of the big picture ideas of the separation of 
ownership and control, brought forward a couple of decades with analysis of links to contemporary debates on 
constitutional rights of corporations Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection 
of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952). Other articles address 
control theory in corporations and enterprise liability, that seem to grow out of early Berle. See, Published Works, 
supra note 3. 
13 Bratton, this symposium. Bratton discusses Means’ focus on administering prices --in Means’ dissertation but 
omitted from MCPP, yet essential to understanding the ideas in the book. 
14 A conference held at Stanford in 1982 on the 50th Anniversary of the publication of MCPP represents the new 
movement’s challenge to Berle and Means. See 26 J. L. ECON. 235 (1983).  Bill Bratton’s contribution in this 
symposium discusses Means’ participation in that conference and the newcomers’ challenge to the Berle and 
Means thesis evidenced at that conference. 
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Means corporation held center stage.15  Even so, most of his ideas for reform clustered around 
protecting shareholders against management overreaching, ideas that by themselves in the 
“normalcy” of the 20s would not have commanded lasting attention. Yet, with the return of a 
progressive Democrat to the presidency, and the transformative expansion of the federal 
government in the wake of the unprecedented economic calamity of the Great Depression and 
then world war, there was room for new approaches.  The New Deal essentially added one new 
financial statute per year until the outbreak of the second World War that cumulatively sought 
to bring more social control over finance.16  Berle’s explanations provided fertile ground to 
support the growth of such broad change.17  During this time, Berle was in (or within sight of) 
the mainstream of political developments.  Thereafter, politics became too wide and too deep; 
his sallies into the larger political space were briefer and fewer and he spent more time in the 
protected coves of foundations and the university.18 
Berle’s personal traits certainly shaped his political role and he surely benefited from 
another political development of the period—changes in the staffing of the presidency and the 
executive branch that made room for the brain truster role he most valued He served such a 
function for David Lilienthal in Wisconsin before FDR and for LaGuardia in New York City 
afterwards.19  The term, however, does not necessarily suggest a precise definition. For Berle it 
meant a freelancer as to ideas and a free agent. As he described himself in a letter after the 
election in 1932, “I shall choose merely…being an intellectual jobber and contractor from time 
to time when jobs come forward.”20  This was “to have the thing in life that he most wants.”21  
The “free” part seems to have been key.  Full of ideas, he believed he could take on a wide 
                                                     
15 See Brian Cheffins’ contribution, this symposium. 
16 This legislation included the Securities Acts of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935, among others. See generally, Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74; Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803; Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 
40; Maloney Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1070; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149; Investment Company Act of 
1940, 54 Stat. 789; Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847. 
17 There is something of a disconnect between Berle’s early corporate law writings from the 1920s and his 
responses to the Depression.  Both are contained in MCPP and the relationship is sometimes hard to reconcile.  
William Bratton and Michael Wachter in a series of articles singly and together, have provided a helpful typology 
identifying “early”, “middle”, and “late” Berle.  Both early and middle Berle are interspersed in MCPP, a 
disconcerting result, but one that reflects the changing political trends in the wake of the economic calamity at the 
end of the 1920s. See, Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5 at 121. 
18 This analogy derives from an insight of Dan Ernst. 
19 See Schwarz, supra note 3 at 72. 
20 Letter from August A. Berle to John Hanna, Columbia Law Professor, November 16, 1932 in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 
1918-1971, FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE (Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs Eds. 1973) at 80-81 
(“short of some particular set of circumstances imposing a real obligation, I should be merely foolish to trade this 
for the mazes of official life in Washington”). For Berle’s use of this “intellectual jobber” term in a different 
context, see Harwell Welles’ contribution in this symposium. 
21 Letter from August A. Berle to John Hanna in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20 at 81. 
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range of issues and then was on to the next challenge, often without the need to stay long on a 
particular topic.22 
At the same time, other personal traits limited his effectiveness in the roles he 
undertook after 1932. He was unquestionably smart.  He believed he could do almost anything: 
solve the sugar problem in the Dominican Republic; become a Russian expert simply by 
stepping behind a desk at an Army hall in World War I; join in the heady days of peace talks 
with little more than university degrees.23  Two other qualities, however, limited his 
effectiveness.  First, he regularly preferred one-off tasks, serving as the intellectual jobber and 
free-lancer that he described in his 1932 explanation as to why he would go back to New York 
City.  Implementation of policy did not hold nearly the attraction for him that ideas or solving a 
particular problem did.  Even when he went to the State Department (in 1938 and again in 1961 
as discussed below) he thought he could do what needed to be done in six months and then be 
on to something else.  The semester-long period of a professor’s typical class may have been his 
optimal time target.  Second, (and probably a side effect of the first quality), it was a challenge 
for him to work as part of a team.  As a New York newspaper columnist concluded when Berle 
went to Washington, “the widespread conviction that Berle is just as good as he says doesn’t 
make him any easier to take.”24  Co-workers found him a challenge, not just for his ego and 
vanity, but also for his impact on team production.  “He works in every direction, with or 
without instructions,” one colleague said, “Berle’s sphere of activity is still more or less of an 
enigma.”25  His strengths that stood out in drafting speeches for the President or presenting the 
structure of an academic article worked less well in a two or three-year process to build out a 
detailed system of post-war international economic agencies.  Berle’s quick mind didn’t give 
him the detailed knowledge of monetary control and trade restrictions that the international 
process needed. 
                                                     
22 His biographer Schwarz includes an example of how Berle “acquired expertise quickly” as “a clever man bent 
upon capturing the ears of men in power.” See Schwarz supra note 3 at 23-24.  As Berle told the story in an oral 
history at Columbia Law School in 1969 he was at the Army War College near the end of World War I awaiting 
reassignment after service in the Dominican Republic.  The officer at the desk where Berle was standing received 
orders for Siberia and immediately left the building.  Berle assumed the position behind the desk, soon be 
confronted by an orderly with a colonel’s request for the current exchange rate of Finnish marks.  Berle retrieved a 
newspaper from the trash, answered the colonel’s question and soon received several additional queries which 
Berle answered.  When the colonel subsequently appeared to see who had been answering his questions, he made 
Berle his “expert” on Russian economics. See, The Reminiscences of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Manuscript of Transcript of 
Oral History Interview, Oral Research Office of Columbia University, December 5, 1969 at 32-34. 
23 These examples are discussed supra note 22 and in Parts I and II below. 
24 Rodney Dutcher, “In Washington”, a syndicated column as published in the Dubuque TELEGRAPH-HERALD, February 
16, 1938 at 6. 
25 Diary, Breckenridge Long Papers December 20, 1940 at 233 Library of Congress. Long was an assistant secretary 
of state. 
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I. Influencing the New Deal from New York City, 1933-1937  
After the election in 1932, other prominent members of the brain trust entered the 
administration—Raymond Moley as assistant secretary of state, for example, and Rexford 
Tugwell as assistant secretary of agriculture.  Berle continued to be based in New York, teaching 
law at Columbia and practicing law with his brother.26 
That did not keep him from regular tasks for the President.  During the period between 
the election and inauguration (then a four-month period, six weeks longer than the current 
transition), Berle worked on railroad reorganization, sparking a disagreement with another FDR 
advisor from academia, Felix Frankfurter, his former professor.27  Berle was willing to 
acknowledge the reality of size in the modern economy and have government regulate big 
corporations while Frankfurter’s approach was aligned with the Brandeisian model of breaking 
up large entities to enhance competition among small participants.28  Right after the 
inauguration, Roosevelt designated Berle and others to meet at Treasury with the Federal 
Reserve, private bankers, and others on the banking crisis.  Berle was named secretary of a 
subgroup of five to develop a specific scheme for Congress.29  Over the first six months of the 
new administration he commuted from New York as a special assistant on railroad matters to 
Jesse Jones, chair of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.  He resigned that position 
September 1 when Roosevelt sent him with Sumner Welles (later the Undersecretary of State 
who brought Berle to the State Department) on a special mission to Havana to deal with Cuban 
instability.30 
                                                     
26 Berle also served on the advisory board of the New York Stock Exchange during his time in New York, among 
other activities. 
27 See Raymond Moley Diary January 11, 1933, Raymond Moley Papers Box 1, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA. 
(noting Berle conversation with Moley including Berle expressing the view that Frankfurter was out to ruin him.). In 
a letter to FDR about Frankfurter’s intervention, Berle signed the letter “Yours truly, in a mean state of mind, with 
considerable admiration for F.F’s public career and an intense personal desire to see him shot.” Letter from Adolf 
A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt January 11, 1933 in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20 at 83. 
The Berle-Frankfurter relationship seemingly was never good.  Frankfurter had joined the Harvard law faculty 
during Berle’s second year as a law student. See Roscoe Pound, Frankfurter at Harvard at 137 in FRANKFURTER, A 
TRIBUTE, edited by Wallace Mendelsohn (Reynard & Co. 1964).  Joseph P. Lash, in a biographical essay 
accompanying the Diary of Felix Frankfurter suggested, “There was always an edge to Berle’s opposition, a touch 
of resentment, at having been excluded from Frankfurter’s little elite group of disciples at Harvard Law School.” 
Joseph B. Lash, Biographical Essay, FROM THE DIARY OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (W. W. Norton 1975) at 44.  Jordan Schwarz 
suggested the student had given offense to the somewhat older professor: “Their ambition seemed to need each 
other’s enmity.” Schwarz supra note 3 at 15.   
28 See telegram from Frankfurter to Raymond Moley Jan. 12, 1933: “am greatly disturbed after talking with Berle 
lest governor be embarrassingly involved in support of railroad reorganization bill” Raymond Moley papers, supra 
note 27 Box 68.  A reorganization bill passed on the last day of the Hoover administration. This disagreement 
between Berle and Frankfurter reappeared at various points in the future. 
29 Schwarz, supra note 3 at 86. 
30 Id. at 82, 90-91. 
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Throughout this early period, Berle was central in developing core economic ideas of the 
New Deal.  He shared with other brain trusters Moley and Tugwell a faith in more state 
planning for the economy.  Early on this was evidenced in the corporatist planning approach of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act that was passed in the first hundred days of the New Deal 
providing space for corporations collectively to decide on rules for competition.31  This 
centerpiece of the early New Deal industrial policy empowered the National Recovery 
Administration to oversee broad industry agreement on prices and other matters, but 
ultimately proved unsuccessful in practice even before it was struck down by the Supreme 
Court in 1935.32  During FDR’s second term, as the economic malaise continued, Berle 
embraced the Keynesian idea of government spending to stimulate the economy.  Throughout 
the first two terms, Berle advocated for multiple means to provide more state capital, a view 
shared by Jesse Jones, whose Reconstruction Finance Corporation financed multiple New Deal’s 
programs.  Berle looked to others with similar ideas including, for example, Robert Moses, 
whose planning for New York City was just beginning to takes shape when Berle was 
Chamberlain, and Hjalmar Schacht, the finance chief of the Third Reich until 1937.33  The idea of 
using government capital to enhance the growth of private corporations was an idea that Berle 
shared with John Maynard Keynes even before the specific interactions between the two 
discussed in Part II. 
These tasks and the ideas Berle wrote about provided him a seat at the table but did not 
make him a major actor in FDR’s now famous first hundred days.  Berle had a public role in the 
debate around each of the economic ideas just discussed, although (equally as telling) he had 
no significant role in drafting any of the statutes of 1933 or thereafter or in organizing the 
agencies that were created to administer the burgeoning administrative state, other than a 
brief stint at the RFC in 1933. 
For example, in the drafting of the Securities Act of 1933, Roosevelt had instructed two 
different groups to prepare drafts in the period after his election in 1932.34  After the resulting 
legislation ran into difficulty when it got to Congress soon after the inauguration, the President 
quickly moved to a third group (Felix Frankfurter et al.) who quickly came to Washington for a 
                                                     
31 P.L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
32 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
See generally, Ellis Hawley, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (at 28). See also id at 460-461 (describing an 
early version of the planning orientation –versus competition enhancing or spending—as set forth by  Berle in a 
widely publicized memorandum in July 1938 discussing the lines of inquiry that TNEC might pursue in which Berle 
argued TNEC“ should not assume that all monopoly was bad, that cartels were necessarily harmful, that small 
business was necessarily competitive or necessarily humane, or that big business necessarily grew by predatory 
tactics, and it should realize that there were immense practical difficulties in the way of applying the theory of an 
‘elastic price.’”). 
33 See Schwarz, supra note 3 at 119. 
34 One version came from the work of Samuel Untermyer who had a prominent role in hearings during what had 
been the most recent Democratic administration and the other by Huston Thompson, a former chair of the Federal 
Trade Commission.  See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 1933-1935 at 440 (1956). 
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weekend drafting session that produced the legislation that eventually passed Congress in the 
first hundred days.35  Berle, over that winter, had received a grant from the Commonwealth 
Fund for a project on state securities laws and would have been as well situated substantively 
as Frankfurter to take on the task.36  Berle later told William O. Douglas, his former colleague on 
the Columbia faculty, “I have always felt unhappy that our good friend Felix Frankfurter, who 
knows next to nothing about the subject except on paper, felt that he had reached the final and 
everlasting answer.”37 
Berle had more interest in a federal incorporation bill that would have enacted a federal 
law of corporations, having drafted a bill for a House committee during the transition.38  A year 
later he wrote to Douglas, then a law professor but soon to be SEC chair and later a Supreme 
Court justice: “Confidentially, we are working on a federal incorporation law, which I hope will 
be presented to Congress in the next session.”39  Implementation is often more difficult than 
proposing; that idea failed to make it into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any federal 
legislation since.  Frankfurter, who was in England on leave from the Harvard law faculty, had a 
greater role in the drafting of the 1934 Act than Berle.  Similarly, the breakup of public utilities 
and various new regulatory regimes for investment advisers, mutual funds and broker-dealers 
all went forward without Berle.40 
Berle’s access to Roosevelt did provide him with a recurring role in policy discussions 
including, for example, those between Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Roosevelt.  
Berle’s connections with Brandeis dated back to his youth.  Adolf A. Berle Sr. was a 
Congregationalist minister in Boston and aligned with Brandeis in progressive causes.41  The 
elder Berle provided written testimony for Brandeis during his highly-contested four-month 
confirmation process in 1916 that made him the first Jewish justice on the Supreme Court.42  
                                                     
35 Schwarz, supra note 3 at 82. 
36 Minutes of Legal Research Committee October 22, 1932, Learned Hand Papers, Box 125 Harvard Law School 
Library, Historical and Special Collections Dept. 
37 Letter of Adolf A. Berle to William O. Douglas December 30, 1933, available at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1930/1933_1230_DouglasBerle.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MPB3-57RF].  
38 Schwarz, supra note 3 at 82. 
39 Id. 
40 This is not to say that Berle did not offer ideas. See, Letter of Adolf A. Berle to Benjamin Cohen (then at the 
National Power Policy Commission, December 8, 1934 (enclosing “miscellaneous remarks on the general subject of 
holding companies”) Box 9, National Public Power Committee (Entry 907), Records of the Department of the 
Interior (Record Group 49). See also Letters to Felix Frankfurter, Secretary of the Treasury William Woodin and 
Representative Sam Rayburn concerning the Securities Act of 1933 in NAVIGATING THE WATERS, supra note 20 at 86-
87. 
41 The Brandeis Letters contain several letters of Brandeis to the elder Berle and other references to common 
causes.  See Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, supra note 1 vol. 2 at 91 (Feb. 26, 1908), 152 (September 27, 1906), 161 
(May 20, 1908). 
42 See Senate Report # 409 (1916) at 294-295 (letter of A.A. Berle of February 18, 1916: “many of the interests 
represented by the protesting gentlemen are now and have been ever since I have resided in the Commonwealth, 
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Berle’s first job after graduating from Harvard Law School that same year (assisted by his 
father), had been at the Brandeis firm, where he practiced for a year before joining the army 
when the United States entered World War I.43  Even so, there was a large gulf between how 
Berle and Brandeis viewed the best response to incorporated enterprises that had come to 
dominate the economy since the Civil War.  Brandeis long favored breaking up the big entities 
through antitrust and otherwise while Berle recognized the seeming inevitability of the 
corporate form and sought ways to combat them, particularly via government controls, part of 
the corporatist approach described earlier.  Berle did not confront Brandeis on these 
differences, but neither did he accede to the justice’s preferred economic solution.44 
The New Deal’s legislative agenda faced intense headwinds from the Supreme Court 
during Roosevelt’s first term and Roosevelt had no opportunity to make an appointment to the 
Court until August 1937.45  At times, Roosevelt could not even count on the support of 
Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, or former Columbia Law dean Harlan Fiske Stone.  In the spring of 
1934 Brandeis told Jerome Frank that he wanted to see Berle and Tugwell; after meeting with 
the justice, Berle reported to the President of Brandeis’s concerns about New Deal Programs.46  
During that summer, Brandeis summoned Berle to his vacation home on Cape Cod to again 
express worry about an approach allowing concentration in the economy and the merits of an 
administration response centered on balancing such concentration with government power as 
opposed to decentralizing.47  In September, at Roosevelt’s invitation, Berle participated in a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
against any emergence into public influence and power of anyone not of their number and clan…. [Brandeis] would 
adorn the bench and add to the glory…of the greatest court in the world”). 
43 Berle’s oral history at Columbia describes the elder Berle’s reaching out to Brandeis after the younger Berle saw 
a notice of a job opening at the Brandeis firm. See Reminiscences, supra note 22 at 18. The Brandeis Letters 
contain a letter from Brandeis to the elder Berle responding to Berle Sr.’s letters of January 24, 1906 regarding 
Berle Jr. and of January 30, 1906 (after the announcement by President Wilson of his nomination of Brandeis to 
the court) congratulating Brandeis. The Brandeis response on February 9, 1916 said “It is a great pleasure to have 
your letter[s] of the 24th and 30th as it was recently to meet your son and to be reminded of our more frequent 
meetings years ago.” See Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, v. 4 at 36 supra note 1. 
44 Berle wrote to Justice Brandeis in 1923 seeking advice on whether he should take on a particular client, but the 
exchange probably indicates the lack of mentors Berle had at the time, more than particular closeness between 
the two.  See Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, supra note 1 at vol. 5 page 101 (September 28, 1923). 
45 After a continuing string of non-success before the Court into 1936, Roosevelt launched his Court Packing Plan in 
the winter after the election that year. The plan was rejected by the Senate in mid-1937, but within a month 
Roosevelt made his first appointment to the Court with six more following over the next four years. See A. C. 
Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 84 (2008). 
46 Letter of Adolf A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt (April 23, 1934) (“Mr. Justice Brandeis has been revolving matters 
in his head and I think requires some attention”) in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20 at 95.  Berle’s letter 
opened with the greeting “Dear Caesar” a salutation Berle was prone to use until Roosevelt sent word in the heat 
of the court-packing dispute to desist.  See Berle Diary, March 4, 1937 in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS supra note 20 at 
125. 
47 Schwarz supra note 3 at 166. 
Berle was not directly involved in perhaps the most-pointed message from Brandeis to Roosevelt. After the 
Schechter decision in 1935, supra note 32 and accompanying text, Brandeis told Corcoran and Cohen “This is the 
end of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the president that we are not going to let 
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discussion including the President, SEC chair Joseph Kennedy, and a railroad president at Hyde 
Park about the administration’s approach to concentration in the economy.48 
During this time, when not performing tasks for the President, Berle was actively 
engaged with the Fiorello LaGuardia’s campaign to become mayor of New York, an election that 
took place in November of 1933.49  Arguing on behalf of the reforming Republican against a 
weak Tammany incumbent and an anti-Tammany Democrat whom FDR could have backed, 
Berle played a key role in keeping the President neutral.50  LaGuardia won the election with a 
plurality of the vote and offered Berle the job of chamberlain of the City where he could take 
on the task of coordinating the response to the city’s financial crisis.  The position was made for 
a brain truster.  Berle biographer Jordan Schwarz described it as “providing the opportunity to 
delve into anything he and LaGuardia considered fair game.”51  Berle described the job as 
permitting him “to cover a good deal of general brain trusting for the administration on a wide 
variety of subjects including elevator strikes, transit unification, the rehabilitation of the credit 
of the City of New York, salvaging the real estate mortgage bond situation, and so forth.”52 
II. Moving Inside the Administration: The State Department 1938-1944 
 
A.  Initial Expectations 
There were recurring efforts to get Berle to Washington.  Undersecretary of State 
Sumner Welles pushed during 1937 for Berle to join the State Department.53  He had the good 
sense to make the pitch to Berle as a position that would permit double brain trusting, for both 
the President and the State Department.54  What evolved was a mix of economics, diplomacy, 
and politics that appealed to Berle’s free agent/intellectual jobber approach to life. 
The Great Depression hung on despite New Deal efforts (including a second new deal in 
1935-36) and the economy took another dip in the fall of 1937 through most of 1938.  After 
LaGuardia’s re-election and with the economy suffering, Berle was among eight men—
                                                                                                                                                                           
the government centralize everything.” See Jeff Shesol, SUPREME POWER, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT V. THE SUPREME COURT at 
598 quoting Harry Hopkins, “Statement to Me by Thomas Corcoran Giving His Recollections of the Genesis of the 
Supreme Court Fight”, April 3, 1939, Harry Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library. 
48 Schwarz, supra note 3 at 106. 
49 See George Whitney Martin, CCB: THE LIFE AND CENTURY OF CHARLES C. BURLINGHAM, NEW YORK’S FIRST CITIZEN, 1858-
1959 (2005) at 339-340 (describing Berle in a group of four reform leaders that helped LaGuardia to power). 
50 Id at 95. 
51 See letter of Adolf A. Berle to Arthur Mann, March 31 1965 and April 21, 1965. “Roosevelt considered he had a 
half-commitment to [Democratic candidate Joseph] McKee…I like to think I neutralized his influence…Roosevelt 
said nothing and stayed out” in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS supra note 20 at 89. 
52 Schwarz, supra note 3 at 97. 
53 Berle Diary, April 29, 1937 in Navigating the Rapids, supra note 20 at 126. 
54 See Schwarz supra note 3 at 110. 
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industrialists, union leaders, and brain trusters—who gathered at the Century Club in New York 
in December, 1937 to debate possible changes in the administration’s economic policies.  Most 
of the group then met with the President early in the new year pushing broader federal 
spending, although the effort failed to gain much traction.55   
As Berle began work at the State Department after he was confirmed by the Senate on 
March 4, 1938, he continued to be active in formulating economic policy.  In 1939, for example, 
he testified before the Temporary National Economic Committee, a joint group of members of 
both houses of Congress and cabinet/agency representatives, on proposals for access to capital; 
he suggested, for example, a bank where government agencies could go for public works or 
congressional creation of a capital credit bank for public or private enterprises in need of 
financing not available via private lending —all ideas consistent with the state-provision of 
capital that was a familiar Berle theme.56 
Similarly, Berle continued to be active in politics during his time at the State 
Department.  For example, he made a trip to Colorado to speak to Democrats in August of 1939 
and to Texas in February of the following year.57  Of course, his day job was in the department 
entrusted with American foreign affairs and he had been hooked on diplomacy since his World 
War I experience.  After joining the Army when America joined the war, Berle was sent to the 
Dominican Republic to secure legal title to Dominican sugar for United States interests, an 
experience that engendered a lifelong interest in Latin America and in foreign affairs.58  Berle’s 
experience in Paris, when the Army rushed him and many others for the sudden arrival of peace 
negotiations in 1918, impressed upon him (and many others in the American government) the 
need to plan for peace in an entirely different way when faced with another world war. Prior to 
his State Department tenure, Berle had been an American commissioner to the 1936 Buenos 
Aires conference on peace in the hemisphere, also attended by the President and Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull.59 The conference, which reflected the administration’s Good Neighbor 
policy, sought to create a tighter bond between the U.S. and the Americas at a time of 
darkening clouds internationally.  Berle’s continuing interest in Latin America and his resistance 
to British trade restrictions and its imperialistic desires could be seen in this period and later 
when he got to the State Department.  
But even the diplomatic tasks he undertook once he joined the administration as 
assistant secretary—a trip to Lima for an Inter-American Conference in 1938, negotiating a deal 
with Canada regarding the St. Lawrence seaway, speechwriting after the Munich conference-- 
                                                     
55 Navigating the Rapids, supra note20 at 154-157, 159-160. 
56 Ernest K. Lindley, “The Capital Bank, Mr. Berle’s New Idea” Washington Post May 28, 1939 at 9. 
57 See notes 84, 90 and accompanying text. 
58 See Reminiscences, supra note 22 at 5. 
59 See Beatrice Bishop Berle Diary December 2, 1936 in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS supra note 20 at 119 
Thompson, Berle During the New Deal 
 
13 
 
had a strong flavor of one-off tasks of a freelancer.60  A British foreign office reported, “Neither 
I, nor anyone else I know of, has any idea of why Mr. Berle was appointed or what he did in 
office….he has told me that he was engaged in economic work and was attending to no routine 
matters at all.”61 
Consistent with that approach, Berle didn’t see himself staying long at the State 
Department—perhaps six months in his original conception.  As that period was running out, 
and after he had submitted a resignation letter to the president, he got caught up on the 
Czechoslovakian crisis.62  He helped advise Secretary of State Hull and write the President’s 
speech after the Munich agreement and his resignation was delayed.63  After going to Lima as a 
commissioner to the Inter-American conference in December 1938 he took a leave of absence 
for six weeks or so to ponder approaches before returning to daily work at the department.  
During 1940, Berle again expressed his expectation to return to New York after the election.64 
Over this period of his early time at the State Department, three developments reset his 
decision space, extended his tenure, and changed the focus of his work.  The most dramatic 
change, of course, was the outbreak of war in Europe in mid-1939 and the fall of country after 
country in the spring of 1940 leaving the United Kingdom seemingly isolated against the Axis.65  
But it wasn’t just a change in world events; there were unexpected political changes afoot in 
domestic politics as a possible third term for Franklin Roosevelt was broached and moved to 
reality.  After his trip to Colorado in August of 1939, Berle reported to Roosevelt that 
Democrats there saw the choices as a third term or Hull.66  Before going to speak to Texas 
Democrats in February of 1940, Berle went to see the President, so as to be warned off of any 
incorrect messages in the anticipated speech;  Berle then told the Texans “the President does 
not want a third term” but would accept a draft.67  Three weeks before the election he was 
                                                     
60 See Schwarz supra note 3 at 123-1287, 147-155. 
61 See Schwarz, supra note 3 at 125.Such a status was not unprecedented. Ray Moley had been assistant secretary 
of state at the beginning of the Roosevelt administration with no diplomatic duties.  Rather he spent his time in the 
early months as the primary intermediary between the administration and Congress as to the legislative project of 
the first hundred days. Even so, Moley’s lack of connection to the Secretary and the department likely hurt him 
when the planning and implementation of the London Economic Conference in mid-1933 took unexpected turns, 
leading to his resignation. See Albin Krebs, Raymond Moley, Roosevelt Aide, Dies; Brain Trust Leader Coined ‘New 
Deal” New York Times, February 19, 1975. 
62 See Letter of Adolf A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt (August 16, 1938) in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20 at 
181. 
63 Berle Diary September 14, 1938 in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20 at 184 (“The Secretary also asked the 
President if he would hold my resignation until we saw where this came out, which the President promptly agreed 
to do.”) 
64 Schwarz supra note 3 at 125, 142. 
65 By the fall of 1940, Berle, in a letter to Columbia University president Nicholas Murray Butler, said “there is no 
more fascinating place in the world than the State Department just now.”  See Schwarz, supra note 3 at 125 citing 
Berle diary October 11, 1940 Berle Papers Box 30. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. 
66 Berle Diary, Memorandum to the President August 14, 1939, Berle Papers Box 66, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. 
67 Schwarz supra note 3 at 142. 
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summoned to the White House for campaign speech-writing duties: “it was the old brain trust 
back again, except the scene was the cabinet room, instead of the Hotel Roosevelt.”68  Berle 
was to serve the third term in DC, but his focus changed. Economics was still a key topic, but 
world events made it more international than domestic and more focused on structuring a new 
approach to international economic relations. 
B. Designing the Post War Economic Structure for the World 
With the outbreak of war in Europe and the increasing likelihood of a third term for Roosevelt, 
Berle’s time horizon for his tenure in government lengthened and the pursuit of a new 
international economic structure occupied a large and continuing place in his work.  This Part 
first outlines the general approach that Berle and other New Dealers had in addressing these 
problems, the evolving understanding of economics in the world order, and the competition 
between different parts of the administration to plan this structure. Subsequent Parts outline 
the evolution of this planning and Berle’s role in it focusing on the distinctively different tenor 
of the early part of this period from the later part. 
1. Laying down a marker: This time would be different.  
Berle, Roosevelt, and other New Dealers who had seen the peace process after World 
War I up close approached their task in a new war resolved that it would be different for them; 
the time for making peace was during the war, not after it.  Berle had initially served in the 
Dominican Republic in World War I, as discussed above.  He arrived back in Washington for a 
new assignment just as the war ended and a mad scramble began to negotiate the peace.69  He 
was among a large number of army officers dispatched to Paris, talking his way into a room at 
the main hotel, joining a group of then-youthful officers who would go on to high positions in 
American government—John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, William Bullitt;  Berle, with Bullitt and 
others were the “jeunesse radicales” who had protested the penal nature of the peace that 
constricted post –war development.70   
Franklin Roosevelt, then assistant secretary of the navy, formed his own perception of 
the process that shaped his own approach as president.71  Berle and Roosevelt had 
                                                     
68 Id. 
69 Reminiscences supra note 22 at 32-34. 
70 Berle Diary December 7, 1918 in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS supra note 20 at 7. See also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The 
CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919-1933 (1988) at 11-12 (describing “a young man’s world at Versailles” including Berle 
as “acting chief of the Russian section”). 
71 Roosevelt was not part of the official delegation to the Peace Conference but visited Europe while it was going 
on and was a fellow-traveler on the U.S.S. George Washington to the United States when the president took a brief 
break from his four-month attendance at the conference.  During the voyage, the future president joined 
conversations about the League of Nations with the incumbent president.  See Frank Freidel, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY (Little Brown 1990) at 31 (describing Roosevelt’s luncheon with Wilson). 
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conversations on these issues going back to the 1932 campaign.72  John Maynard Keynes, to 
become a key player on the British side in the negotiations to come, had argued in the earlier 
period for American wealth to bankroll the reconstruction of Europe.73 He was not successful in 
blocking a penal peace coming out of the Versailles conference but his book on the deficiencies 
of the peace process increased his stature.74  His challenge to the neoclassical paradigm as to 
government’s role in priming the economy from his 1936 book, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY, influenced New Deal efforts on spending in 1938 and 
thereafter.  From mid-1940 he was a key figure for the Treasury on the British side in the 
process described in the following section. 
Berle continued to have a highly visible profile.  His 1940 book, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE NEW 
WORLD, written in part during his State Department sabbatical, supported a post-war economic 
system in which American wealth would play a role similar to what Keynes had suggested for 
the post World War I period.75  Another book that year by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner 
relied on Berle’s unpublished diaries in examining American diplomacy after the Munich crisis, 
suggesting America could be drawn into war.76   
In 1941 Berle was active in several important pre-war issues for the American president.  
Early in that year, a fight between State and Treasury on freezing foreign assets while America 
was still neutral went to the White House where Roosevelt upheld Berle and the State 
Department’s view against such action.77  Berle also played a key role in early 1941 in securing 
Canadian agreement to an agreement for the St. Lawrence Seaway.  During talks in Ottawa 
where Berle initialed the agreement for the United States, Berle seemed to build Canadian 
interest for more integrated defense and economic planning involving the two neighbors.  Later 
that spring in a meeting at Roosevelt’s home at Hyde Park, the Canadian prime minister 
secured Roosevelt’s assent for American lend-lease to, in effect, subsidize UK purchases from 
Canada, a concession that seemed to dull the Canadian interest in Berle’s larger plans for 
integrated government planning.78 
                                                     
72 Schwarz supra note 3 at 211. 
73 Berle describes first meeting Maynard Keynes during this period, although not working closely with him. See 
Reminiscences, supra note 22 at 13. 
74 J.M. Keynes, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PEACE (1919). 
75 Adolf A. Berle, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE NEW WORLD (1940). 
76 Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, AMERICAN WHITE PAPER: THE STORY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SECOND WORLD 
WAR (1940). 
77 Berle diary, February 17, 1941 in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20 at 358.  But by June events of the ground in 
the form of German military strikes against more countries led to the State Department agreeing that freezes were 
justified. 
78 Schwarz supra note 3 at 155. 
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2. The Substance to be Covered by the Economic Plan: Trade, Monetary Issues, and 
Development. 
While the key players agreed on the value of planning, it took longer to identify what they 
wanted to plan and longer still to arrive at an agreement on the plan.  Twenty-first century 
commentators regularly look back to the economic changes in the international order resulting 
from World War II and focus on three international institutions—the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (and its predecessors)—created at 
Bretton Woods in 1944 and in other international conferences of the period.  Indeed, the 
planning from the very beginning of the war focused on the three overlapping set of 
international economic issues associated with these organizations—monetary policy, capital for 
development, and trade.  Plummeting international trade after the stock market crash and 
increased tariffs of the period cut wealth across borders.  Currency manipulation and 
continuing challenges from efforts to return to the gold standard in many countries fueled 
economic unrest. Insufficient capital was available for stabilization and development, a 
challenge made so much greater by war. Problems in each exacerbated worries in the other 
two. 
The text for international agreements had only been completed for the IMF and World 
Bank when the delegates gathered at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire in the summer of 
1944, but Roosevelt’s message to the delegates was clear as to the integral role of trade in the 
overall approach to international economic relations.  He noted that the program to be 
discussed at Bretton Woods “concerns the basis on which [ordinary men and women] will be 
able to exchange with one another the natural riches of the earth and the products of their own 
industry and ingenuity. Commerce is the life blood of a free society. We must see to it that the 
arteries which carry that blood stream are not clogged again, as they have been in the past, by 
artificial barriers created through senseless economic rivalries.”79  The post-war path of the 
trade portion of this agenda is beyond the scope of this article except to say that that path 
illustrates the interconnectedness of the various parts of international economic law that the 
Berle-era drafters saw clearly, the enduring centrality of the questions that were the focus of 
the initial planning, and the continuing relevance of that period to contemporary debates.80 
                                                     
79 See Franklin Roosevelt, Proceedings of Bretton Woods, Volume 1 at 71(U. S. Government Printing Office). 
80 US and UK diplomats picked up the trade discussions in 1945 leading to a conference in Havana in 1948 
approving a treaty that would have set up the International Trade Organization. Insufficient support in Congress 
for American ratification in the new Cold War political climate blocked the ITO leading to a more informal 
operation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This international cooperation grew and 
became more formal and very successful over time leading eventually to multilateral acceptance via treaty of the 
World Trade Organization in the 1990s. Disruption of the previous seven decades of international trade policy via 
Brexit and Trump is the reality of the current world.  See generally Douglas A. Irwin, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE, A 
HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY (University of Chicago Press 2017) Part III. 
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Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Berle’s boss, had long dreamt of structural response to 
the tariffs that had grown substantially in response to the Great Depression and to the 
disruptions of war that had undercut trade.81  American planners saw the importance of trade 
to produce employment at home and how opening trade for undeveloped countries could 
increase the standard of living around the globe.  Trade traditionally held out the lure of 
comparative advantage. One country (or producer) could focus more on products in which it 
had a relative advantage (e.g. natural resources available to it, more than to other producers) 
and could trade those products for other products which were not as available within its 
borders, but more so in some other country.  Tariffs could distort this exchange as countries 
sought to protect their domestic producers and gain a greater share of market exchanges.  This, 
in turn, caused countervailing tariffs and other acts by other countries and the decline of 
international trade. 
International trade, even with no tariffs, is unlikely to leave any country with an exact 
match of its exports and imports, such that there will be a need for an adjustment mechanism 
for the currency received in exchange of the goods.  The gold standard provided a long-used, if 
imperfect, mechanism for such adjustments.  The national currency of a country that regularly 
imported more than it exported may well see the value of its currency (relative to gold) become 
less valuable and take steps to bring its imports and exports back into line.  But such change in 
the exchange rate could lead to inflation or deflation of the country’s currency that would 
impact the health of the domestic economy in ways that the government may wish to 
encourage or avoid.  Thus, there would be a temptation for a country to manipulate the 
exchange rate, for example to make its goods cheaper and the goods from other countries 
more expensive.  German, Japanese, and even British currency manipulation during the 30s 
illustrated such distortions to the economic status quo.82  Our own times provide current 
examples of fears of currency manipulation and imbalances in trade and efforts and a need for 
international agreements to prevent crises that have led to currency wars in the past.  The gold 
standard had another disadvantageous effect in that the natural scarcity of the mineral and its 
somewhat random distribution about the globe made it difficult for governments to quickly 
provide the liquidity necessary in periodic panics that gripped economies.83 
Finally, the destruction of war across the globe greatly exacerbated the capital needs 
generated by years of economic depression.  The likelihood of private capital sufficient to meet 
                                                     
81 Richard Gardner, STERLING DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (New Expanded Edition 1969) at 101. 
82 Ed Conway, THE SUMMIT, BRETTON WOODS 1944, J.W. KEYNES AND THE RESHAPING OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018) at 83. 
83 See Mervyn King, THE END OF ALCHEMY, MONEY, BANKING AND THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2017) at 162 
discussing the importance of central bank responsibility of two key aspects of the management of money in a 
capitalistic economy: “to ensure that in good times the amount of money grows at a sufficient rate to maintain 
broad stability in the value of money” and “to ensure that in bad times the amount of money grows at a rate 
sufficient to provide the liquidity…required to meet unpredictable swings in the demand for it by the private 
sector…  These two functions are rather simple to state, if hard to carry out.” 
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such needs seemed remote; the ability of many individual countries to generate sufficient 
capital internally called for an international response. 
Planners seeking to put the post-war economy on firmer footing, particularly in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, saw all three of these challenges- trade, monetary and 
capital for redevelopment - as requiring an international structure beyond that which then 
existed.  As the planning process evolved, initial attention was given first to the monetary 
challenge with separate plans being developed each by American and British teams.  The capital 
needs of reconstruction were coupled with these negotiations, often as a junior partner until 
the second week of Bretton Woods when discussion about the World Bank took center stage.84  
Trade negotiations ended up on a different track, taking somewhat longer to complete.  That 
description, however, blurs a much more nuanced development that merits additional 
attention, both for what it tells us about Adolf Berle, and better understanding where we are 
today on these same questions. 
3. A Rumble Along Pennsylvania Avenue: Competition among agencies of the American 
government in responding to post-war planning 
Richard Gardner in his classic book on the period, STERLING DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, observes that, “by 
the time the United States entered the Second World War, its great executive departments 
were engaged in a major struggle over their respective responsibilities for the planning of post-
war foreign economic policy.”85  The topic naturally linked to both foreign affairs and financial 
policy so both State and Treasury could claim a natural interest.  Roosevelt was known to not 
rely on fixed lines of authority and preferred to let his advisers and agencies fight it out, as in 
the drafting of the federal securities act described above.  The early planning for a post-war 
economic structure followed a similar path of shared effort.  Roosevelt wanted both State and 
Treasury involved and also the Board of Economic Warfare, which at the relevant time was run 
by Vice President Henry Wallace, a possible candidate to be Roosevelt’s successor.86 
State and Treasury, the bigger institutional and political players, were situated along 
Pennsylvania Avenue on either side of the White House.87  Hull occupied the senior cabinet seat 
and had a political role to match, based his previous time in the Senate and House and his 
regular mention as a possible successor to Roosevelt.  At Treasury, Henry Morgenthau had the 
                                                     
84 Conway, supra note 82 at 237. 
85 Gardner, supra note 81 at 71. 
86 This agency went through various name changes and reorganizations of its own in the period before and after 
the United States joined the war.  The Economic Defense Board, chaired by the vice president, was established in 
the summer of 1941 while the United States was still ostensibly neutral.  After Pearl Harbor, the name changed to 
the Board of Economic Warfare, although recommendations to the President from both the Board and the State 
Department would be made through the office of the Secretary of State Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy 
Planning Preparation 1939-1945, Department of State Publication 3580 (1950) at 33. 
87 State was then located in the building currently known at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, adjacent to 
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advantages of more detailed knowledge of financial matters and closer personal ties to the 
president as his neighbor along the Hudson River. The State Department with its traditional 
dominance in foreign affairs probably should have been considered the favorite in betting on 
how this competition might come out and the topic seemed a natural for Adolf Berle to have a 
major role within the department.  Schwarz described Berle as “probably the highest-ranking 
official in Washington conversant with Keynes’ ideas in 1938.”88  Berle’s proposals for 
government’s response to the economic crisis the late 30s were influenced by and consistent 
with the stimulus favored by Keynes in times of economic weakness.89  Berle repeatedly wrote 
about the need for capital and new ways government might provide it. 90 
Like Keynes, Berle was a public intellectual of the day, comfortable in writing and 
speaking about a variety of topics.  This period also showed Berle’s ability to present a broader 
message of America’s changing role in the world economy, a topic on which Berle was 
optimistic.  In a Fortune magazine piece before Pearl Harbor, he forecast that the United States 
would emerge from the war as the richest country and with an altruistic policy, because in the 
natural order of things any economics is moral.91  In a speech before the Yale Political Union the 
previous year, he presciently observed that it may seem “fantastic today to suggest handing 
over some of our accumulated gold as a free gift to re-establish international currency, to let 
other nations set their house in order, and thereby reestablish trade and normal life.  But this 
may not seem so fantastic a few years hence.  It seems impossible today to think of using the 
enormous resources of the Federal Reserve System as a means of rebuilding the shattered life 
of another continent, but when the time actually comes… we may find the idea looks more like 
an immediate necessity than a fairy tale.”92 The actual outcome, in which Treasury, not State, 
ended up with the major role and Berle was eclipsed, not just in dealings with the British, but 
also within State, is a revealing part of the Berle story. 
4. The Evolution of Post-war Planning in Three Acts: During American Neutrality; the Rumble 
along Pennsylvania Avenue; and Treasury Triumphant  
 
a. During American Neutrality before Pearl Harbor  
Planning for the post-war period began almost as soon as Germany invaded Poland in 
1939.  Two weeks later, Hull appointed Leon Pavolsky as special assistant to work on the 
                                                     
88 Schwarz, supra note 3 at 119. 
89 See text accompanying note 84, 90. 
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problems of peace.93  By the end of the year, Hull had appointed a 10-member committee on 
the Problems of Peace and Reconstruction that included most of the senior officers on duty, 
including Pavolsky and Berle.94  In another two weeks, the title morphed into the Advisory 
Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations to work through three subcommittees: politics; 
armaments (soon folded into politics) and economics.  Berle served on the economics 
subcommittee, which was the first to organize and focused on a conference of neutrals.95  
In May, after large Germany gains across western and northern Europe, a new 
interdepartmental committee was created—the Interdepartmental Group to Consider Post-
War International Economic Problems and Policies.  The State Department numerically 
dominated this group, but its membership went outside the State Department to bring in 
officials from Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture.96  This group included Treasury Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau and his chief advisor on monetary policy Harry Dexter White, who would 
play a large role as the Bretton Woods process unfolded.  The last seven meetings of this group 
in the last quarter of 1940 were devoted wholly to post-war preparations.97 
During this period Berle worked with Harry Dexter White on an Interamerican bank to 
finance development in Latin America, in part as a means to withstand totalitarianism in the 
western hemisphere.  As Berle biographer Jordan Schwarz described it, Berle’s idea was based 
on “little more than a casual conversation” with Jesse Jones at the RFC and faced resistance 
from Treasury secretary Morgenthau, but White’s “first-class missionary work” at Treasury and 
Jones’ efforts with bankers got the backing of the president.98  Congressional resistance to 
funding and the failure of several countries to subscribe their shares eventually put this 
proposal on the shelf. Nevertheless, White and his treasury team in the first half of 1942 
developed a Stabilization Fund and Development Bank proposal for a global response which, 
along with Keynes proposal for a clearing union, became the fulcrum of discussion from that 
time through the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, as discussed in the next section.99 
Anglo-American discussions in the period prior to Pearl Harbor about Lend-Lease, the 
American provision of key armaments and supplies to the United Kingdom and other countries 
without immediate payment, raised the curtain on what would be the most contested issues of 
post-war economic planning.  In preparing for talks to be held in Washington during the 
summer of 1941, the State Department was attuned to Hull’s interest in trade and the rising 
tide of American dominance in international exchange; they wanted to see trade free of 
discrimination in favor of British colonies as part of the tradeoff for Lend Lease.  Keynes, making 
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his first trip to Washington on behalf of the Treasury, pushed back on such ideas arguing  that 
the post-war recovery of the UK’s economy sufficient to repay the loans taken out to fund the 
heavy costs of fighting Germany would require discrimination in favor of future trade between 
London and its colonies.  This issue became a key topic of discussion at the Atlantic Conference 
between Churchill and Roosevelt in Newfoundland in August 1941.  Welles, in reaction to 
Keynes’s earlier statements in Washington, pushed for a strong prohibition of discrimination in 
trade. Churchill balked. Roosevelt suggested language papering over the divergent views with 
the precise meaning to be worked out in later discussions which extend well past the end of the 
war.100 
b. After Pearl Harbor   
In 1942 with America now at war, interdepartmental planning for post-war efforts 
stepped up again and became more detailed.  An Advisory Committee of officials at State and 
other Departments and members of Congress was formed and organized into six 
subcommittees that met weekly.  Berle was active in the economic subcommittees of this 
group, chairing 16 meetings in the first half of 1942 with Dean Acheson, at this point also an 
undersecretary of state, chairing other meetings.101 
Monetary and banking strategizing was typically a concurrent activity under the 
leadership of Treasury.  Here is where the most important preparatory work for Bretton Woods 
actually occurred.  Keynes, after the Lend Lease brouhaha, had begun drafting a new plan for 
monetary policy based on a sophisticated concept of a “Clearing Union” which would permit 
countries to trade “bancor” units.  This new currency unit, as an alternative to gold, would 
provide more flexibility than a gold standard to debtor nations (as the United Kingdom had 
become, with the necessity of war borrowings).  After Peral Harbor, Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau put White in charge of Treasury’s foreign relations and asked him to “provide a 
basis for a postwar international monetary arrangement.102 White proceeded to develop his 
own stabilization and development plan more reflective of the United States position as a 
creditor nation and the rising hegemon in international financial affairs. The Keynes and White 
plans formed the basis for US-UK discussions culminating with the agreements at Bretton 
Woods. 
In July 1942, one of the interdepartmental planning committees—this one chaired by 
White—decided on bilateral discussions of memoranda (i.e. the Keynes and White proposals) 
                                                     
100 Gardner, supra note 81 at 41-42, 46-47.  Churchill relied on a statement by Roosevelt in Newfoundland that the 
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with the British as the way forward and these conversations occurred in September.  While 
Berle had pushed for discussion of the White plan at the July meeting, in between that meeting 
and the bilateral discussions, he promoted his own proposal for a United Nations Bank for 
economic reconstruction.103  When Keynes came to Washington to discuss these plans in 
September of 1942, the first meeting was in Berle’s office104 and Berle continued to be the 
point person at state in the months that followed.  Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
had told the British representative that financial matters were under Berle.105  The American 
questions to the UK about the Keynes plan went through Berle in October and came back to 
Berle in November.106  In between Berle gave a major speech on foreign policy on October 
15.107  In late 1942, it seemed to the British and the Canadians that Berle was calling the shots 
“for the financial aspects of post-war planning.”108 
c. Treasury Triumphant   
Behind the scenes things were shifting.  In October Morgenthau and White went to 
England ostensibly to discuss finances for the invasion of North Africa.  But the Americans 
arranged for White and Keynes to meet for a long substantive session of the two monetary 
plans.109  After the State Department’s formal notification in November that it was ready to 
proceed with talks on monetary policy between the US and UK governments, White and Keynes 
plans picked up their earlier discussions.  In the first part of 1943 as differences still remained; 
Berle agreed to continue bi-lateral conversations but didn’t want it to appear that other nations 
were being presented with a fait accompli. Thus, Berle initiated discussions with the Chinese.110  
Over the next two months the two US and UK camps bickered back and forth as to whether the 
two competing plans would be published as if so, by whom, leading to eventual leaks and 
publications of both. As the plans had become more detailed and more public, the role of 
Treasury had become more entrenched.  By early spring clarity came in the form of an official 
U.S. announcement that Treasury “though consulting with others, would be expected to ‘carry 
the ball’.”111  In the future the British would go to Morgenthau, not Berle.112  When Keynes 
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again visited Washington in September, 1943 Berle sat in on the meeting but deferred to 
Treasury leadership.113  When the two countries and allied nations met the following July in 
Bretton Woods for the conferences proposing the IMF and the World Bank, Berle did not 
attend. 
The State Department retained the lead role in negotiations for trade (labeled by the 
two sides as “commercial”), but Berle was not a leading figure in that either.  The September 
1943 meetings involved a combined British delegation that came to Washington for both trade 
and monetary discussions.  Berle was involved but not like the previous year.  The White-
Keynes talks continued at long-distance through the fall, winter and spring, at Atlantic City in 
the week before the beginning of the Bretton Woods conference and then for most of the 
month of July at Bretton Woods. 
When the President called on Congress to pass the Bretton Woods proposals for the IMF 
and the World Bank, he noted his expectation that proposals for the reduction of trade barriers 
and other matters “will shortly be ready to submit to you for your consideration” as part of the 
United States taking the lead in “establishing the principle of economic cooperation as the 
foundation for expanded world trade.”114  Yet the trade part had not made nearly as much 
progress as the monetary portion.  While the monetary issues had been assigned to Treasury in 
the spring of 1943, trade remained under the State Department, with a delegation led by 
Myron Taylor, Harry Hawkins and Dean Acheson—not Berle.  Those talks got no further than 
broad agreement on the importance of trade to expand employment and to identify the issues 
of quantitative restrictions and trade preferences but put off the next steps until the beginning 
of 1945. In December, 1945 the United States invited the wartime allies to enter into 
negotiations for a multilateral agreement on trade in goods with related talks in London and 
Geneva leading to a charter of an International Trade Organization approved in Havana in 
March 1948.115 
d. Denouement 
As these broader international economic issues moved away from Berle during the war, 
one area remained, that of a proposed international civil aviation treaty with the conference to 
be held in November, 1944 in Chicago.  Differences between the U.S. and the U.K. over rights to 
fly the Atlantic held up a final agreement, although eventually there was a treaty and an 
international civil aeronautics association that reflected Berle’s work.  During the conference 
held shortly after Roosevelt’s reelection, White House advisor Harry Hopkins flew out to 
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Chicago to tell Berle there was not a place for him in the fourth term.116  Sumner Welles left as 
undersecretary the previous year and Hull was retiring at the end of the month.  The new 
secretary would bring his own people. 
The position offered to Berle was Ambassador to Brazil, which he did for 13 months with 
mixed results.117  He negotiated to be able to attend a conference in Mexico City in early 1945 
and to be able to make a personal report to the President.  But by April the President was dead 
and Berle soon headed back to New York and Columbia. 
C. Responsibility Outside of Economic Planning  
While Berle had his largest continuing impact on various matters relating to economics there 
were other topics of recurring responsibility.  Latin America, a life-long interest discussed 
elsewhere in this article, was one, intelligence was another.  Berle’s government service first 
intersected with intelligence in World War I during his time in the Dominican Republic.  After 
completing his work relating to land titles affecting sugar he extended his stay at the request of 
the governor and the chief of military intelligence to feel the pulse of the countryside.118  When 
the State Department set up an intelligence division in late 1940, Roosevelt soon asked that 
Berle coordinate overlap with the FBI and its director, J. Edgar Hoover. 119  The FBI already 
operated outside of the U.S. in Latin America and, in consultation with Berle and military 
intelligence, decided to create a Special Intelligence Service to operate in South America.  When 
the U.S. later decided to set up a separate secret intelligence agency the president first 
followed his “competition between agencies” approach with Berle negotiating for the FBI to 
have the western hemisphere and military intelligence with responsibility for the rest of the 
world.  As William Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services grew, Berle’s role diminished. 
Berle’s role in the State Department intelligence led to his involvement in two other 
intelligence matters that subsequently gained political prominence:  Whittaker Chambers’ 1939 
charges that Alger Hiss was a communist agent, leading to two trials and Hiss’s conviction of 
perjury in 1950; and similar charges against Treasury’s Harry Dexter White that led to Berle’s 
statement to another Congressional committee later in the 1950s.  In 1939, Chambers had gone 
to the White House to expose Alger Hiss, then a state department employee, as a 
communist.120 Marvin MacIntyre, the president’s secretary, told Chambers to take it to Berle in 
the State Department overseeing intelligence. The day after Germany invaded Poland, 
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Chambers revealed his charges to Berle, who took notes and reported it to the President.  FDR 
showed little interest in the report, nor did others seem interested in pushing it along.  
Germany was the focus—the Soviet Union had by that time signed a non-aggression treaty with 
Germany, eventually becoming an American ally after Germany’s invasion the following year. 
Eighteen months after the Chambers visit, Berle went to the FBI in March 1941 and asked what 
it knew of Chambers.  Fourteen months went by before the FBI interviewed Chambers and an 
additional 13 more months went by before the Bureau requested Berle’s memo of 1939. More 
time passed until the State Department’s security office questioned Chambers in March 1945. 
Elizabeth Bentley, another self-confessed Communist spy, went to the FBI with her own 
allegations about Hiss in 1945, but there was still little immediate movement.121 
Once the 1946 elections switched control of the House of Representatives, and in the 
face of rising tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the activity relating to 
the old accusations picked up.  The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) held 
hearings in 1948 including Chambers’ charges against Hiss, who had risen in the state 
department in the nine years since Chambers-Berle meeting, eventually serving as a 
presidential advisor at Yalta and helping set up the United Nations.122  Hiss’s strong defense to 
the charges and his libel suit against Chambers provoked Chambers to produce additional 
evidence and that provided part of the basis for perjury charges against Hiss.  When called to 
testify before the HUAC committee, Berle downplayed the importance of Russian surveillance 
as an existential threat and took a swipe at Dean Acheson, then undersecretary, for the 
Department’s failure to pursue Berle’s preferred hard line toward the Russians.123 
A  second parallel thread of Congressional  hearings into alleged communist spying 
involved charges made against Harry Dexter White.124  White had been nominated by President 
Truman in January, 1946 to be the American executive director of the IMF, with the expectation 
that the United States would back him for managing director, the top position of the new 
entity.125  However, White’s name had surfaced in allegations by Elizabeth Bentley who had 
named White as part of a group in Treasury and other departments who were funneling 
information to Russia.126  In late 1945, J. Edgar Hoover had informed the White House’s FBI 
liaison, with copies to the Secretary of State and Attorney General, warning of the danger of 
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appointing White to the IMF, but that information did not seem to have any effect before 
White’s nomination was announced.  Hoover then prepared a special report for the president 
that set off alarm bells at the White House; yet even here the keystone cops caper continued as 
the White House’s call to the Senate to stop the vote on the nomination came too late.127 To 
avoid signaling American knowledge of the spy ring, the administration chose to not seek 
White’s resignation or removal.  However, the administration did choose not to put White’s 
name forward for the top IMF job, saying it would support an American instead for the top job 
at the World Bank.128 
Even so, White only stayed one-month past the March 1, 1947 official opening of the 
IMF doors.  He was interviewed by the FBI in August 1947, had a severe heart attack soon after, 
testified before a grand jury March 24 and 25, 1948, but was not indicted.  After Chambers and 
Bentley both testified before HUAC that summer against White, White himself testified on 
August 13 gaining positive reports in the press.129  On the train to his summer home in New 
Hampshire the next day he suffered a second severe heart attack and died the following day. 
Congressional attacks on White continued posthumously with Richard Nixon revealing in 1950 
that he had documents hand-written by White that had been turned over by Chambers, from 
the same hidden cache of “Pumpkin Papers” that had surfaced during the Hiss investigation. In 
1951 both Bentley and Chambers testified against the deceased White before a Senate 
committee.130  Two years later, counsel for another Senate committee called on Berle looking 
for testimony on whether Harry Dexter White was a Russian spy.  Berle replied that he had no 
knowledge of the now deceased White and did not much care.  “There were Soviet spies and 
there was Communist infiltration.  Taken together, it made a little trouble and probably did not 
vary greatly the course of affairs… But directing the whole course of American politics in 1954 
to examination of the mistakes of 1944 gets us absolutely nowhere.”131  
III. Post-War Return to New York City as a Public intellectual, Professor, and Politician 
After a rocky 13 months in Brazil, Berle returned to New York to teach, practice law, participate 
in state and national politics, and contribute to the public discussion of ideas.  With Truman 
now President, Berle no longer enjoyed the access to the White House that he had for twelve 
years. The Liberal Party of New York became his platform for political involvement when he 
became chair in early 1947.  The party enjoyed some success in pursuing a balance of power 
strategy; for example, it helped Herbert Lehman beat John Foster Dulles in the Senate race in 
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1949.  Berle retained some personal influence, serving as part of Stevenson’s brain trust in 1952 
and 1956 and interacting with the Eisenhower administration via Nelson Rockefeller (then a top 
official at State), Allen Dulles at the CIA, and others.  He joined a group with roots back to the 
Versailles peace conference to help found Radio Free Europe and volunteered more than half of 
his time to that cause in the early 1950s. In some ways the pattern parallels his political 
involvement in New York between 1933 and 1937 –with one difference: The third party balance 
of power strategy did not provide any significant key policy-making influence once the election 
was over in contrast to what had happened in the LaGuardia administrations. 
Latin America provided a continuing, if still sporadic, entre to policy-making in an area 
Berle cared about. In the early part of the Eisenhower administration, he journeyed to Costa 
Rica for discussions with its President and was involved in addressing its conflict with Nicaragua, 
its larger neighbor. At the later request of the CIA he helped the elected president of Honduras 
deal with a military coup.  Later in the decade, he continued to be involved as Latin America 
responded to the Cuban revolution.  More generally he collaborated with Henry Kissinger in a 
years-long task of a Rockefeller Fund report chaired by Dean Rusk, putting him in the orbit of 
two future Secretaries of State.132  When John Kennedy was elected president in 1960, Berle 
wanted in.  He was asked to chair a transition task force on Latin America, leading to a position 
as chair of an interdepartmental task force on Latin America with an office in the State 
Department near to Rusk (who had said that all roads in Latin American affairs led to Berle.)133  
This was a task an intellectual jobber could appreciate and he signed on for six months. 
Unfortunately for Berle, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, a CIA operation, dominated the 
history of those six months that  some in Latin America saw as unilateral intervention, and one 
which the anti-Castro Cubans saw as Americans leaving them on the beaches. With the failure 
of the mission and the administration’s Latin American policy in some disarray, Berle  returned 
to New York. 
Berle had at least one more role on the national political stage. When Lyndon Johnson 
became president after John Kennedy’s assassination, New Dealers like Abe Fortas and Jim 
Rowe were close to the new president and reached out to Berle to provide an FDR connection 
for LBJ.134  Berle became involved in the Dominican Republic, where his interest in foreign 
policy had been sparked a half century before. Berle sought to walk the line between differing 
factions, but in late April 1965 Johnson ordered a United States invasion, which Berle, the long-
ago advocate of Dominican self-determination, justified to prevent a Castro-mounted takeover.  
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The following month, Johnson invited Berle to lunch at the White House.135  The president also 
wanted to discuss an even bigger topic Viet Nam, and here too, Berle seemed willing to have 
the United States fight to keep freed colonial people free from communism. 
Against this pattern of somewhat humbling results in politics and diplomacy over the 
second-half of his career, Berle found a continuing outlet in his academic and policy writing.  
Upon rejoining Columbia, he returned to law review writing (which he had abandoned, except 
for a couple of exceptions after 1934), and authored a dozen books.  Even more, his biographer 
Schwarz noted, “Perhaps nothing else during these troubled times gave Berle more satisfaction 
than his chairmanship of the Board of Trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund.  He saw in the 
Fund his last great quest to be a powerful brain truster—a ‘causative’ intellectual making 
history.”136 That public policy think tank permitted him to explore, and support others in 
exploring, a variety of issues across a broad range of topics. 
Berle’s most lasting impact in the post-1932 period was his own academic writings.  His 
post 1946 law review articles took some of his earlier topics and developed them in light of 
developments since 1932.  His 1952 Penn Law Review article on Constitutional Limitations on 
Corporate Activity may be the most creative of this group.  Anticipating the constitutional 
debate of the early 21st century on constitutional rights of corporations, Berle started from the 
then-current picture of corporate law: “classic corporation law is almost never availed of to 
adjust the relations between the corporate enterprise and the community.”137  For the 1932 
Berle, this was a no-brainer: corporations have economic and political obligations and privileges 
and are expected to produce an economic result acceptable to the community.  The 1952 
article saw the challenges in extending individual rights, but not in the way that contemporary 
cases like Citizens United138 and Hobby Lobby139 have developed.  Berle’s focus was more on 
corporations being subject to the constitutional limitations which limit the state itself because 
of the power that has accrued to those entities.140 
Elsewhere, Berle dealt with a disconnect between corporate theory –the sovereign’s 
grant of certain attributes of personality to a corporate group-- and the underlying economic 
reality of an enterprise operating via multiple entities within an enterprise.141  Berle put 
forward a revision of the classic conception, arguing for enterprise liability. A principal focus 
was the then-recent liability-creating Supreme Court case in Anderson v. Abbott written by his 
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former Columbia colleague and fellow-New Deal progressive, William O. Douglas.142  In another 
article, he took on the question of corporate control, as in the then-recent case of Perlman v. 
Feldmann, written by another strong New Dealer on the Second Circuit, Charles Clark.143  A core 
foundation of this article, common to his other writing, was the community’s “vivid interest in 
the policies and operations of the corporation.”144 
In Berle’s last article, he returned to a theme of the MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY to emphasize the change in the nature of property resulting from the rise of the 
corporation.145  Unlike his first employer, Brandeis, he long before had cast his lot with 
accepting the large corporation and using government to match it.  In the Constitutional piece 
discussed above, Berle outlined the direction law should follow: “to assure that the market 
power of the enterprise shall not be used so as to create or perpetuate conditions that the 
state itself is forbidden to create or maintain.”146  In Property, Production and Revolution, he 
suggested the need for a new role for shareholders with a different kind of governance role 
reflecting a more transitory ownership of stock in large corporations that was essentially more 
liquid than comparable interests in earlier businesses rather than .  Shareholders in this view 
act less as an allocator of capital and more as a “vehicle for rationalized wealth distribution 
corresponding to and serving the American ideal of a just civilization.”147 In these ideas, Berle 
came closest to a reprise of the ideas of his intellectual trifecta of 1932. 
Conclusion 
Eighty-five years after his most notable intellectual contributions, Adolf Berle’s impact still can 
be characterized as distinctive. His public renown has been surpassed by few law professors 
before or since.  What explains his lasting recognition?  Ideas, like people, come in a multitude 
of variations.  In one sense, his recognition reflects a particular idea at a particular time.  There 
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normal effect of corporate existence to act as an insulator from liability: “]t]o allow this holding company device to 
succeed would be to put the policy of double liability at the mercy of corporation finance.”) Four justices dissented 
arguing that Congress had not “announced a legislative policy such as the Court announces” Id at 374. Berle was 
sympathetic to some broadened liability across entity boundaries but would permit a corporate group to preserve 
separateness if the parent required the subsidiary to “manage its own affairs, make its own decisions, and operate 
as a separate entity.” Enterprise Liability, supra note 141 at 357. 
143 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (controlling shareholder breached fiduciary duty by siphoning 
off for personal gain corporate advantages to be derived from a favorable market situation due to quasi-price 
controls during the Korean War, but not saying that a majority shareholder can never dispose of controlling block 
for a premium  
144 Adolf A. Berle, “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM L. REV. 1212, 1215 (1958). Berle argued that Perlman went 
far in the direction of his position in MCPP that control belongs to the corporation not the shareholders who can 
deliver control. Id at 1221 and that those who run corporations are stewards for employees, customers, suppliers 
and the community affected by their operations. Id at 1212. 
145 Adolf A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1965). 
146 Id at 10.   
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was a new kind of a corporation in a changed economic setting that required a different 
government response. How many professorial efforts could be fit into such a template?  The 
difference was the timing.  The severity of the Great Depression and then the world war that 
accelerated the coming of an American hegemon in global economics enhanced and deepened 
the questions he addressed and magnified the usefulness of the framework he identified.  In 
the absence of those factors it is not surprising that he could not replicate the impact of his 
1932 ideas as part of the Roosevelt administration over the next twelve years or as a public 
intellectual in the quarter-century that followed.  The match in those times of ideas and current 
political trends was more ordinary. Yet a deeper understanding of both what fit so well in the 
early 1930s and less so afterwards can productively inform our analysis of current challenges.  
Berle demonstrated that a law professor skilled in the nuances of corporate law could 
simultaneously be a force in broader policy matters with an effect lasting generations. 
